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AbstrAct
The present paper aims to analyze the advancement of  environmental 
provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), more specifically, in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Even though the TPP might never en-
ter into force due to political changes in the United States’ government, the 
rules established under it represent the new benchmark on trade and envi-
ronment linkage. The language adopted in the Agreement is already guiding 
negotiations in the multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral level. This study is 
divided into three main sections. In the first section, the interplay between 
international trade and protection of  the environment will be depicted. In 
the second section, the phenomenon of  the advancement of  environmental 
provisions in PTAs will be analyzed. In the third section, the environmental 
provisions consolidated in the TPP will be considered. The methodology 
adopted in the development of  this research is bibliography, descriptive and 
exploratory. In conclusion, it can be asserted that incorporation of  envi-
ronmental provisions in PTAs has assumed an increasing importance in the 
efforts to render international trade and environmental protection mutually 
supportive and to achieve sustainable development goals. Among PTAs, the 
TPP stands out as the most modern advanced in terms of  environmental 
provisions. However, the TPP’s analysis demonstrated that environmen-
tal consequences of  the implementation of  preferential trade agreements 
should be further assessed. This would allow the elaboration of  preventive 
measures to overcome possible side effects, such as the increase of  trade in 
fossil fuels or the reallocation of  pollution intensive industries, due to the 
other trade liberalization provisions. 
Keywords: Environment. Preferential Trade Agreements. TPP. 
resumo
O presente artigo pretende analisar a expansão de dispositivos ambien-
tais em Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio (APCs), mais especificamente, 
no Acordo Transpacífico (TPP). Mesmo que o TPP nunca chegue a entrar 
em vigor devida a mudanças políticas no governo dos Estados Unidos, a 
regras nele estabelecidas representam a nova referência sobre a relação en-
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tre comércio e meio ambiente. A linguagem adotada no 
Acordo já orienta as negociações em níveis multilateral, 
plurilateral e bilateral. Este estudo é dividido em três 
seções principais. Na primeira, a interação entre comér-
cio internacional e meio ambiente será demonstrada. 
Na segunda, o fenômeno da expansão dos dispositi-
vos ambientais nos APCs será analisado. Na terceira, 
os dispositivos ambientais consolidados no TPP e a as 
suas implicações serão considerados. A metodologia 
adotada no desenvolvimento desta pesquisa é bibliográ-
fica, descritiva e exploratória. Em conclusão, pode-se 
afirmar que a incorporação de normas ambientais em 
APCs vem assumindo uma importância crescente nos 
esforços para tornar o comércio internacional e a prote-
ção ambiental mutualmente favoráveis e para se alcan-
çar as metas do desenvolvimento sustentável. Dentre os 
APCs, o TPP se destaca como o mais moderno e avan-
çado em termos de dispositivos ambientais. No entan-
to, a análise do TPP demonstrou que as consequências 
ambientais da implementação de acordos preferenciais 
de comércio devem ser avaliadas mais profundamente. 
Isso permitira a elaboração de medidas preventivas para 
superar possíveis efeitos colaterais, como o aumento do 
comércio de combustíveis fósseis ou a realocação de 
indústrias de poluição intensiva, decorrentes de outros 
dispositivos de liberação comercial.  
Palavras-Chave: Meio Ambiente. Acordos Preferen-
ciais de Comércio. TPP. 
1. IntroductIon
It is no longer reasonable to envisage a sustainable 
economic order disconnected from an international tra-
ding system that promotes environmental protection. 
Since the end of  the twentieth century, environmental 
protection has acquired an unprecedented importance 
thanks to huge risks coming from the stunning degrada-
tion of  nature. As an outcome, the relationship between 
international trade and the environment sets the center 
stage so as to alleviate awful menaces that hover on the 
entire Humanity. 
At the multilateral level, the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) progress on this matter has been modest. 
The exception clause of  the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) lists situations and require-
ments that allow countries to disregard the liberaliza-
tion duties accorded. Article XX b and g determines, 
respectively, that nothing in the Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting Party of  measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; and relating to the 
conservation of  exhaustible natural resources.1 This ar-
ticle inspired similar provisions included in other WTO 
Agreements. 
The Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement) and on the Application of  Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) are par-
ticularly important because they authorize trade restric-
tions so that legitimate environmental objectives can be 
achieved. Under the TBT Agreement, technical regu-
lations shall not be more trade-restrictive than neces-
sary to fulfill a legitimate goal, such as the protection 
of  human health or safety or plant life or health, or the 
environment (Article 2.2). Under the SPS Agreement, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall be applied 
based on scientific principles and only to the extent to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health (Article 
2.2). The SPS Agreement also covers ecological and en-
vironmental criteria within its conditions for risk asses-
sment (Article 5.2) and demands governments to take 
into consideration ecosystems as one aspect in determi-
ning disease or pest free areas (Article 6.2).
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) also alludes 
to the environmental protection by establishing an ex-
ception with respect to patents. Members may exclude 
an invention from patentability when necessary to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid 
serious prejudice to the environment (Article 27.2).
1  It is also worth mentioning that in the EC – Seals Products 
Case (DS401) the exception of  the article XX (a) was recognized as 
potentially usable for assuring animal-welfare. The Appellate Body 
upheld the Panel’s decision that the EU Seal Regime is ‘necessary to 
protect public morals’ within the meaning of  Article XX (a) of  the 
GATT 1994 (Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Meas-
ures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of  Seal Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS401/AB/R (22 May 2014)). In the India – Solar Cells Case 
(DS456), India has also try to justify its domestic content require-
ments in the initial phase of  the national solar mission under the 
exceptions of  Article XX (d) and (j). However, India’s attempt was 
unsuccessful and the Panel found that it failed to demonstrate appli-
cation of  such exceptions. On April 2016, India notified the Dispute 
Settlement Body of  its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body cer-
tain issues of  law and legal interpretation in the panel report (Panel 
Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
WTO Doc WT/DS456/R (24 February 2016)).
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The Doha Round impasse precluded the advance-
ment of  important trade related environmental rules. 
Presently, there is no specific WTO Agreement that 
deals directly with the promotion of  sustainable deve-
lopment through trade liberalization. This subject is ap-
proached separately in different provisions of  the WTO 
multilateral agreements.
The most significant initiative on the environmental 
mandate brought by the Doha Development Agenda is 
found in the negotiation of  the Environmental Goods 
Agreement (EGA).2 So far, the goods object of  nego-
tiation cover a broad range of  environmental catego-
ries, like air pollution control, renewable energy, waste 
management and wastewater treatment. Even so, EGA’s 
talks are far from being concluded.        
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have dissemi-
nated too fast since the end of  the Uruguay Round. A 
vast amount of  PTAs either increases the scope of  the 
WTO rules or regulate subject matters that do not be-
long to the multilateral trading system. Their negotia-
tions have yielded effects not yet fully assessed. 
Translating pressures from civil societies, preferen-
tial trade agreements came to contain environmental 
clauses or even entire chapters on that matter. Rules 
vary in accordance with the specificity, legal depth and 
bindingness of  the commitments. They do not only rea-
ffirm what has been adopted under the WTO Agree-
ments, but also advance on topics not yet regulated by 
the Organization, exemplified by fisheries subsidies, il-
legal logging and wildlife trafficking.
Among the new generation of  PTAs, special atten-
tion should be drawn to negotiation of  the Mega Regio-
nal Trade Agreements (Mega-RTAs), a label coined to 
mean agreements bringing together the most powerful 
world economies. Due to their geographic extension 
and economic relevance, the topics that are being cur-
rently negotiated or have already been adopted will cer-
tainly be multilateralized in the future. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) connects ele-
2  The 17 participants in the negotiation of  the Environmental 
Goods Agreement are: Australia, China, Costa Rica, the European 
Union (representing 28 members); Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Is-
rael; Japan; Korea; New Zealand; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; 
Separate Customs Territory of  Taiwan; Penghu; Kinmen and Matsu; 
Turkey; and the United States (WTO SECRETARIAT. Trade and En-
viroment: DG Azevedo welcomes progress in Environmental Goods 
Agreement. Available at: <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news15_e/envir_14dec15_e.htm>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 2016).
ven economies of  Asia and the Pacific Ocean to the US 
economy. Originally a Free Trade Agreement between 
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore (Pacific-4), 
the TPP comprises more eight countries: United Sta-
tes, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru 
and Vietnam. It amounts to 36.3% of  the world GDP 
and 25.5% of  the world trade. After five years of  ne-
gotiations, the countries achieved a final version of  the 
Agreement in October 2015 in Atlanta (United States). 
The TPP has been the deepest plurilateral trade agree-
ment signed since the end of  the Uruguay Round in 
1994. To enter into force, it is necessary the approval by 
the legislative powers of  all signatory countries within a 
period of  two years since the Agreement’s signature or 
– after the expiry of  this period – by at least 6 countries, 
which together account for at least 85% of  the combi-
ned GDP of  the original signatories.3 
Given the political changes in the United States’ 
government due to the election of  Donald Trump for 
president, it is unlikely that the agreement might one 
day produce its legal effects. In his first week as presi-
dent of  the United States, Donald Trump withdrew the 
U.S from the TPP, keeping with one of  its campaign 
promises. During Barack Obama’s administration, the 
TPP was never presented to the U.S Congress given the 
lack of  necessary parliamentary support to adopt the 
agreement. Even though the TPP might never enter 
into force, the rules established under it represent the 
new benchmark for trade and environment linkage and 
are already guiding negotiations on this matter in the 
multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral level. Its impor-
tance resides in the language consensus achieved by 12 
developed and developing on a controversial topic. The 
TPP text will shed light in the future international nego-
tiations and norm-setting. Therefore, it is so relevant to 
assess its provisions and implications for the governan-
ce of  international trade and environment.  
From this perspective, this article intends to analyze 
3  THORSTENSEN, Vera; NOGUEIRA, Thiago; ARIMA 
JÚNIOR, Mauro. Introdução. In: THORSTENSEN, Vera; 
NOGUEIRA (Coord.). O Tratado da Parceria Transpacífica (TPP): Im-
pactos do Novo Marco Regulatório para o Brasil. São Paulo: VT, 
2017. p. 47. In this regard, Thorstensen et al. highlight that the 85%’s 
figure was not a random choice. The TPP could not enter into force 
if  it were not ratified jointly by the two largest economies of  the 
trading bloc: United States and Japan. These countries, respectively, 
amount for 63% and 17% of  the combined GDP of  the original sig-
natories. Hence, the United States and Japan, even separately, could 
prevent the entry into force of  the TPP.
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the evolution of  the relationship between trade and en-
vironment beyond the WTO, in PTAs, paying particular 
attention to the TPP. We are specifically concerned with 
a particular question of  whether a balanced relationship 
was achieved between trade and the environment.  This 
paper is divided into three main sections.
In the first section, the interplay between interna-
tional trade and the environmental protection will be 
depicted. The aim is to demonstrate the environmen-
tal effects for international trade, especially how and 
to what extent the liberalization and the expansion of  
international trade can harm or help the protection of  
the environment.  
In the second section, the inclusion of  environmen-
tal provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements will be 
considered. Our purpose is to investigate the types of  
environmental provisions adopted, the ways in which 
they have been incorporated and the main incentives 
for embracing those clauses.  
At last, the provisions adopted under the Environ-
ment Chapter (Chapter 20) of  the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership will be assessed. The TPP represents the most 
advanced regulatory framework in terms of  trade and 
environment linkage. 
The importance of  this research resides in iden-
tifying the main trends and patterns concerning the 
adoption of  environmental provisions in the TPP. This 
is crucial to understand the relationship between regio-
nalism and multilateralism and to foresee its consequen-
ces for the international trade regulation. 
2. InternAtIonAl trAde And the protectIon 
of the envIronment
The first major initiative to incorporate environmen-
tal provision into the world trading system dates back 
to Uruguay Round (1986-1994), curiously the same pe-
riod that the Rio Summit on the Environment and De-
velopment took place. Naturally, some conclusions of  
that summit reverberated in the Uruguay Round. More 
broadly, international environmental law started actually 
to be consolidated in 1960s. 
Nevertheless, drawing on the observation by Dupuy 
and Viñuales, the failed Havana Charter4 and even its 
predecessor, ‘the 1927 Convention for the Abolition of  
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions,5 both 
contained explicit exceptions to accommodate what 
today would be called environmental measures.’6 The 
1947 GATT only incidentally alluded to protection of  
natural resources.7
Throughout time, international trade and the en-
vironmental protection have followed different paths, 
rarely crossing their sphere. Both fields had different 
logics and principles to address particular problems. 
However, due to the swift depletion of  natural resour-
ces deriving from the industrialization process, the envi-
ronmental protection became a political sensitive issue 
mobilizing both societies and governments to enhance 
the interaction between trade and the environment.8
The grass roots social movements played a decisi-
ve role in the formulation of  claims for environmental 
regulation. NGOs acted in several fronts, such as in-
formation collection and dissemination, policy develo-
pment consultation, policy implementation, assessment 
and monitoring and advocacy for environmental justi-
ce.9 Its political activism grew continuously and its in-
fluences could be noticed in the outcomes of  1972 and 
1992 United Nations Conferences.10
As new ecologically responsible standards were 
being internationally agreed, domestic environmental 
regulations have started to collide with trade obliga-
tions, reaching the GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
system. The multilateral trading dispute settlement sys-
tem has already appreciated a number of  trade disputes 
4  Article 45 (1) (a) (x) of  the Havana Charter for an International 
Trade Organization, 24 March 1948. 
5  Article 4 of  the Convention for the Abolition of  Import and 
Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, 8 November 1927.
6  DUPUY, Pierre-Marie; VIÑUALES, Jorge. International Environ-
mental Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 391.
7  LOWENFELD, Andreas. International Economic Law. 2. ed. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 372.
8  AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto. Comércio Internacional e Proteção do 
Meio Ambiente. São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 139.
9  GEMMILL, Barbara; BAMIDELE-IZU, Abimbola. The role 
of  NGOs and Civil Society in Global Environmental Governance. 
In: ESTY, Daniel C; IVANNOVA, Maria H. (Ed.). Global environmen-
tal governance: Options and opportunities. New Haven: Yale School 
of  Forestry & Environmental Studies, 2002. p. 77-78.
10  Article 12 of  the 1992 Rio Declaration affirms that: ‘trade 
policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute 
a means for arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised re-
striction on international trade.’  
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involving environmental aspects,11 such as the noto-
rious cases: US – Shrimp-Turtle; US – Tuna-Dolphin I 
and II; and Brazil – Retreated Tires. In order to illustrate 
this collision, it is worth highlighting briefly the most 
important aspects of  these cases. 
In the US – Shrimp-Turtle, India, Malaysia, Pakistan 
and Thailand claimed that the US regulation12 ‘requi-
ring that all shrimpers, foreign and domestic, expor-
ting shrimp to the USA use a ‘turtle excluder device’ 
(TED) according to the US agency standards’13 violated 
GATT’s Articles XI (prohibition on quantitative res-
trictions). The United States alleged that this measure 
fell under the GATT Article XX (general exceptions) b 
(animal life) and g (exhaustible natural resources). The 
US supported that this measure was necessary to avoid 
the accidental catch of  sea turtles and other endange-
red species both under the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of  Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) and the 1973 US Endangered Species Act.14
The United States appealed the panel’s ruling, whi-
ch found the US measure to be in violation of  Article 
XI and not justifiable under Article XX.15 The Appella-
te Body recognized that ‘under WTO rules, countries 
have the right to take trade action to protect the envi-
ronment (in particular, animal or plant life and health) 
and endangered species and exhaustible resources).’16 
However, the Appellate Body kept the panel’s ruling on 
Article XX, because the US measure discriminated un-
justifiably between WTO Members. It provided other 
countries – mainly in the Caribbean – more favorable 
conditions regarding the use of  TEDs than the four 
11  Examples of  trade-related environmental disputes include: 
United States – Taxes on Automobiles; United States – Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventions Gasoline; European Commu-
nities – Trade Description of  Sardines; and European Communi-
ties – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of  Biotech 
Products.  
12  Section 609 of  the Public Law 101-162. 
13  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 548, Mar. 2013.
14  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 548, Mar. 2013.
15  For a deeper analysis of  the case see: HOWSE, Robert. The 
Appellate Body Ruling in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal 
Base Line for the Trade and Environment Debate. Columbia Journal 
of  International Law, v. 27, n. 2, p. 491-521, 2002.
16  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. India etc versus US: 
Shrimp-Turtle. Available at: <https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm>. Accessed on: 18 Jul. 2017. 
Asian countries (India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand) 
that failed the complaint.17
In the United States – Tuna-Dolphin I, Mexico com-
plaint that the “US moratorium on imports of  Mexican 
yellowfin tuna through the implementation of  US Mari-
na Mammal Protection Act [MMPA]”18 violated GATT’s 
Articles III (national treatment), XI (prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions) and XIII (non-discriminatory 
administration of  quantitative restrictions). The USA 
refuted the applicability of  the mentioned GATT pro-
visions and argued that its measure was allowed under 
GATT XX b and g. The MMPA aimed to promote the 
preservation of  dolphins found in the tropical east of  
the Pacific Ocean through reducing their death caused 
by tuna fishing with the use of  purse seine nets.19
 The panel conclusions can be summed up in two 
main rulings. First, ‘the US could not embargo imports 
of  tuna products from Mexico simply because Mexican 
regulations on the way tuna was produced did not satis-
fy US regulations’ (‘product’ versus ‘process’).20 Consi-
dering that the measure “related to the process of  cap-
turing tuna and not the final product itself, […] GATT 
Article III was not applicable.’21 Second, the ‘GATT 
rules did not allow one country to take trade action for 
the purpose of  attempting to enforce its own domes-
tic laws in another country’22 (extraterritoriality).23 The 
panel found that ‘the US moratorium was beyond the 
reach of  US jurisdiction and, therefore, did not qualify 
17  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. India etc versus US: 
Shrimp-Turtle. Available at: <https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm>. Accessed on: 18 Jul. 2017.
18  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 535-585, mar. 2013, p. 545.
19  AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto. Comércio Internacional e Proteção do 
Meio Ambiente. São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 220. 
20  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. Mexico etc versus US: 
Tuna-Dolphin. Available at: <https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm>. Accessed on: 19 Jul. 2017. 
21  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 535-585, mar. 2013, p. 546. 
22  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. Mexico etc versus US: 
Tuna-Dolphin. Available at: <https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm>. Accessed on: 19 Jul. 2017.
23  It is worth noting that the panel’s report was never adopted. 
Mexico decided to pursue bilateral consultations with the USA in 
order to achieve an agreement outside GATT (WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION. Mexico etc versus US: Tuna-Dolphin. Available 
at: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.
htm>. Accessed on: 19 Jul. 2017).
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for any of  the GATT Article XX exceptions.’24
In the US – Tuna-Dolphin II, the European Com-
munity and the Netherlands brought a similar com-
plaint questioning the US Marina Mammal Protection 
Act. The panel resumed the previously defended theses 
in US – Tuna-Dolphin I.25 This ruling differs from the 
previous by finding that ‘regulatory measures for the 
protection of  human, animal, or plant life could be valid 
under Article XX (b) even if  these measures were not 
confined to the jurisdictional boundaries of  the state 
implementing the regulation.’26 The panel, however, did 
not give further guidance as to under what circumstan-
ces.27
In the Brazil – Retreaded Tires, the EU claimed 
that the Brazilian ban and penalties on retreated tires 
imports from non-MERCOSUR countries28 consisted 
a violation of  GATT Articles I (most-favored-nation 
treatment), III (national treatment), XI (prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions) and XIII (non-discriminatory 
administration of  quantitative restrictions).29 This Bra-
zilian ban was in accordance with the MERCOSUR’s 
Arbitral Award No. 01/2006, exempting MERCOSUR 
countries from this measure. Brazil argued that its mea-
sures intended to reduce the harms produced by retrea-
ded tires in the country, because their undue disposal 
and toxic composition could pose risks to human, ani-
mal and plant life and health. Besides, abandoned re-
treated tires still a serious public health problem in the 
country, since they are the birthplace of  the aedes aegypti 
mosquito, the vector of  several infectious diseases such 
as dengue.30 Brazil alleged that its measures were justi-
24  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 546, Mar. 2013.
25  AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto. Comércio Internacional e Proteção do 
Meio Ambiente. São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 221. 
26  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 547, Mar. 2013.
27  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 547, Mar. 2013.
28  Brazilian National Environment Council (CONAMA)’s Reso-
lution No. 258/99. 
29  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 571, Mar. 2013.
30  MATIAS, João Luis Nogueira; ZANOCCHI, José Maria Mc-
Call. A Compatibilização entre o Comércio Internacional e a Pro-
teção do Meio Ambiente no Âmbito da OMC: Análise do Caso das 
Restrições à Importação de Pneus Recauchutados pelo Brasil. Anais 
do XX Encontro Nacional do CONPEDI, Florianópolis: Fundação 
fied under GATT Article XX b.
The EU appealed the panel’s ruling to the Appellate 
Body, which, in general terms: (i) maintained the panel’s 
finding that the import ban can be considered ‘neces-
sary’ within the meaning of  Article XX b;31 but (ii) it 
decided that the measure was not the least restrictive 
means of  pursuing the environmental objective, being 
applied in a arbitrary manner, leading to unjustifiable 
discrimination in regard to non-MERCOSUR.32 
The above-mentioned cases are just a few examples 
of  intricate interface between trade and environment 
protection. Today we are confronted with a huge envi-
ronmental crisis that prevents the nature from recove-
ring. Further, this rationale interferers with the fragile 
environmental balance of  the planet. The unbridled 
international trade tends to boost an ever-greater de-
gradation of  natural resources, pushing the planet to 
its limits.
Trade issues are linked to central environmental 
challenges, such as: climate change; unsustainable use 
of  natural resources; biodiversity losses; the air, land 
and ocean pollution; and desertification. They put not 
only the environment at risk, but also human health and 
livelihoods around the globe.33 By accelerating the level 
of  economic activity, they provoke the exaggerated use 
of  the earth’s resources, far beyond the natural replace-
ment rate, and the use of  non-renewable resources in an 
incompatible manner with the basic principles of  sus-
tainability. International trade has the potential to beco-
me a powerful source of  environmental degradation if  
environmental values are not taken into consideration.34
It is worth noting that regulatory requirements for 
the sustainable management of  natural resources, en-
vironmental impact assessment studies, treatment of  
Boiteux, p. 4994-5016, 2011.
31  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. Brazil: Measures Af-
fecting Imports of  Retreaded Tyres. Available at: <https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds332_e.htm>. Ac-
cessed on: 19 Jul. 2017. 
32  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 572, Mar. 2013. 
33  BIRKBECK, Carolyn Deere; BOTWRIGHT, Kimberley. The 
Future of  the Global Trade and Investment Architecture: Pursuing Sustain-
able Development in the Global Economy – Overview of  Issues, 
Challenges and Debates. Geneva: International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum, 2015. 
p. 33.
34  AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto. Comércio Internacional e Proteção do 
Meio Ambiente. São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 143-144.
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industrial waste as well as the reparation and compen-
sation in case of  environmental damage are not yet a 
consensus at international level. As a result, a country 
that has stricter environmental rules is in a less favora-
ble position in commercial terms than the one that has 
more flexible rules. This stems from the fact that the 
value of  the goods produced in its territory does not re-
flect the costs related to the compliance with minimum 
standards of  environmental protection, rendering them 
more competitive in the global market.
This situation demonstrates a negative effect of  
trade liberalization. Highly polluting and/or extensive 
natural resource-based enterprises are encouraged to 
move to countries whose legislation and environmen-
tal requirements are softer. Enterprises mostly located 
in the European Union and in the United States try to 
move to pollution havens, in order to escape from its 
stringent national environmental law and, consequently, 
higher production costs. 
In this respect, Frankel asserts that: ‘openness to tra-
de might encourage some countries to specialize in dir-
tier activities, and export their products to others with 
higher environmental standards.’35 On this view, inter-
national trade liberalization has its primary effect on the 
distribution of  pollution across countries, rather than 
on the overall average.36  
In addition, countries with low environmental pro-
tection rules are not motivated to adopt more severe 
environmental rules and those that already have stric-
ter rules find themselves tempted to lower their level 
of  environmental protection to attract new foreign in-
vestments.37 This represents the well-known race-to-the 
bottom hypothesis. Open countries in general adopt 
less stringent environmental regulations than less open 
countries out of  fear of  adverse effects on their interna-
tional competitiveness.38 Countries are led to maintain 
the lowest level of  environmental protection as much 
as possible to keep their competitiveness in the global 
market. However, the race-to-the-bottom argument is 
35  FRANKEL, Jeffrey. Environmental Effects of  International Trade. 
Västerås: Sweden’s Globalisation Council, 2009. p. 7.
36  FRANKEL, Jeffrey. Environmental Effects of  International Trade. 
Västerås: Sweden’s Globalisation Council, 2009. p. 9.
37  QUEIROZ, Fábio Albergaria. Meio ambiente e comércio 
internacional: relação sustentável ou opostos inconciliáveis? Argu-
mentos ambientalistas e pró-comércio do debate. Contexto Internac-
ional, Rio de Janeiro, v. 31, n. 2, p. 258-259, maio/ago. 2009.
38  FRANKEL, Jeffrey. Environmental Effects of  International Trade. 
Västerås: Sweden’s Globalisation Council, 2009. p. 7.
questioned by empirical accuracy, as countries might 
have other genuinely environmental concerns that point 
in the opposite direction. China, for example, wants to 
reduce air pollution at all costs.  
Moreover, arguments advocating potential benefits 
between the two fields must be remarked. The expan-
sion of  international trade, some authors opine, could 
favor technical innovation and, consequently, the disse-
mination of  less polluting forms of  production. Open 
markets are used to stimulate the empowerment of  
consumers who could spur the adoption of  sustaina-
ble corporate codes of  conduct. Besides, the so-called 
Environmental Kuznets Curve39 shows that even tough 
at early stages of  economic development growth may 
bring a deterioration in the environment, after a parti-
cular critical level is reached, the further growth brings 
an improvement.40 Hence, the trade effects on the envi-
ronment would be beneficial in the long run.
As it stands, the impact of  trade liberalization on 
environmental protection is ambiguous. As noted by 
Professors Dupuy and Viñuales, this interaction may 
place constraints on legitimate environmental restric-
tions or contribute to the wider circulation of  polluting 
substances, but it may also lead to a more efficient use 
of  natural resources, as a result of  global competition 
among producers, or to a wider circulation of  environ-
ment-friendly goods and technologies.41
As can be observed, no matter the assumption about 
the relation between the two fields, one thing is sure: 
there is an inseparable link between international trade 
and environmental protection in the pursuit of  sustai-
nable development. According to studies developed by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), environmental problems are not 
caused by trade itself, but by market and intervention 
failures that occur, respectively, when markets do not 
reflect the environmental values and public policies 
create, aggravate or do not correct those failures.42 
39  The environmental Kuznets Curve is a loose U-shaped rela-
tionship between income and environmental quality (FRANKEL, 
Jeffrey. Environmental Effects of  International Trade. Västerås: Sweden’s 
Globalisation Council, 2009. p. 6).
40  FRANKEL, Jeffrey. Environmental Effects of  International Trade. 
Västerås: Sweden’s Globalisation Council, 2009. p. 6.
41  DUPUY, Pierre-Marie; VIÑUALES, Jorge. International Envi-
ronmental Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 391.
42  ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT. The Environmental Effects of  Trade. Paris: 
OECD Publications, 1994. p. 8. 
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Among market failures, special attention should be 
given to externalities. They occur when the actions of  
one person affect others who do not receive any com-
pensation by the damage caused or by the benefits crea-
ted.43 Negative externalities happen when the action 
of  one party imposes costs on others, for example, 
the emission of  polluting gases. Positive externalities 
take place when the action of  one party is beneficial to 
others, such as the conservation of  tropical forests.44 As 
externalities are not turned out in the price, they end 
up becoming a cause of  economic inefficiency. Its in-
corporation into the market is extremely important to 
adjust economic rules to environmental protection.
In this sense, the costs of  negative externalities lie 
in the option of  getting rid of  the waste of  a particu-
lar production process without treatment, leaving this 
burden to the nature. Instead of  being embedded in the 
final price, the cost of  pollution is transferred to the 
environment, inhabitants, fauna and flora. Economic 
agents wish to privatize profits and socialize losses and 
production costs.45
Therefore, the current dynamic of  international tra-
de should be modified to internalize damages to the en-
vironment. The contemporary challenges require joint 
initiatives to incorporate environmental provisions into 
the international trading system structure, so that mini-
mum environmental standards form part of  its norma-
tive framework. Environment and trade policies ought 
to be mutually supportive. 
Trade should not be understood as an end in itself, 
but as a tool to achieve the noblest human purposes, 
which were to Montesquieu and Kant peace and har-
mony among men.46 Countries must reassess ways in 
which international trade can be successfully used to 
foster the protection of  the environment as opposed to 
its degradation.47
A major step in this direction has come about under 
43  AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto. Comércio Internacional e Proteção do 
Meio Ambiente. São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 42.
44  PINDYCK, Robert; RUBINFELD, Daniel. Microeconomia. São 
Paulo: Makron Books, 1994.
45  CAUBET, Christian Guy. A Irresistível Ascensão do Comércio 
Internacional: o meio ambiente fora da lei? Revista de direito Ambien-
tal, São Paulo, v.6, p. 92, abr./jun. 2001.
46  AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto. Comércio Internacional e Proteção do 
Meio Ambiente. São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 127.
47  FRANKEL, Jeffrey. Environmental Effects of  International Trade. 
Västerås: Sweden’s Globalisation Council, 2009. p. 6.
preferential trade agreements. Their regulatory expan-
sion is building new pathways between trade and the 
environment. There are not only clauses on environ-
mental protection but also entire chapters on the sub-
ject. Hence, it is valuable to analyze in what direction 
the international environmental trade rules are heading 
by investigating this new dynamic of  trade negotiations.
3. the expAnsIon of envIronmentAl 
provIsIons In preferentIAl trAde 
Agreements
In the last decades, the world witnessed the increa-
sing proliferation of  Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs)48 concluded in parallel to the WTO system. Ac-
cording to the 2013 World Trade Report, the number of  
agreements more than tripled between 1990 and 2010, 
from around 70 at the beginning of  the period to nearly 
300 at the end.49 As of  1st July 2016, 635 of  them have 
already been reported to the WTO, of  which 423 are 
now in force.50 These numbers represents a shift in how 
trade is being regulated and negotiated internationally.
In accordance with Baccini and Dür, this phenome-
non could be explained as a result of  ‘the stagnation 
of  the process of  multilateral trade liberalization, the 
search for economies of  scale, the desire to signal com-
mitment to specific trade and economic policies and the 
protection of  foreign direct investments.’51 In a similar 
vein, Baldwin understands this new wave of  agreements 
as a response to the demands of  the 21st century regio-
nalism that has as its core the trade-investment-service 
48  Usually, researchers and policy-makers have adopted the terms 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Regional Trade Agree-
ments (RTAs) more or less interchangeably due to the fact that 
PTAs traditionally have a strong regional orientation (WTO SEC-
RETARIAT. 2013 World Trade Report. p. 75. Available at: <https://
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report13_e.
pdf>. Accessed on: 30 Nov. 2016). For now on, the present paper 
adopts the term PTA to describe this type of  agreement.   
49  WTO SECRETARIAT. 2013 World Trade Report. Available 
at: <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_
report13_e.pdf>. Accessed on: 30 Nov. 2016.
50  WTO SECRETARIAT. Regional Trade Agreements. Available 
at: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.
htm>. Accessed on: 15 Nov. 2016.
51  BACCINI, Leonardo; DÜR, Andreas. The New Regionalism 
and Policy Interdependence. British Journal of  Political Science, Cam-
bridge, v. 42, n. 1, p. 57, jun. 2011.
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nexus.52
Although apparently incompatible with the central 
idea of  the multilateral trading system, the Preferential 
Trade Agreements are not prohibited under the WTO 
Law. On the contrary, GATT’s article XXIV allows its 
formation, as long as three conditions are met: (i) the 
customs duties and other regulations of  commerce 
shall not be higher or more restrictive than before in the 
constituent territories; (ii) or in respect to third coun-
tries; and (iii) their reduction shall be scheduled within a 
reasonable period of  time.53 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that this pro-
vision is a clear exception of  the Most-Favored-Nation 
clause established under GATT’s Article I.54 This waiver 
was allowed to enable countries to negotiate and reduce 
tariffs in smaller groups, making global trade liberaliza-
tion easier.
However, increasingly PTAs go beyond the sim-
ple dismantling of  border barriers to trade in goods.55 
Those agreements now regulate services and other ele-
ments of  integration, such as, regulatory liberalization, 
competition policy, investment and intellectual proper-
ty protection. Moreover, traditionally PTAs were only 
restricted to tariff  reduction, encompassing solely the 
already accepted WTO rules (WTO-in).56 PTAs have 
incorporated rules deepening the already existing regu-
lation (WTO-plus) as well as rules about themes that 
don’t pertain to the multilateral trading system (WTO-
-extra).
52  BALDWIN, Richard. 21st Century Regionalism: filling the gap 
between 21st century trade and 20th century trade rules. WTO Staff  
Working Paper ERSD-2011-08. Available at: <https://www.wto.
org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201108_e.pdf>. Accessed on: 16 
Nov. 2016.
53  As stated under paragraph 5, (a) (b) (c), of  1994 GATT Article 
XXIV. 
54  GATT’s article I defines the Most-Favored-Nation Treatment 
as ‘any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originating in or destined for the territories of  all other 
contracting parties.’
55  ROLLO, Jim. The Challenge of  Negotiating RTAs for Devel-
oping Countries: what could the WTO do to help? In: BALDWIN, 
Richard; LOW, Patrick (Ed.). Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges 
for the Global Trading System. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.
56  THORSTENSEN, Vera; FERRAZ, Lucas. A multiplicação dos 
acordos preferenciais de comércio e o isolamento do Brasil. São Paulo: Instituto 
de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Industrial, 2013. Available at: 
<http://retaguarda.iedi.org.br/midias/artigos/51d18e9168afa9d0.
pdf>. Accessed on: 20 Dec. 2016.
In general terms, there is a trend of  legal strengthe-
ning in all regulated areas. As observed by Badin and 
Tasquetto, this encompasses ‘the evolution of  provi-
sions restricted to the cooperation between the parties 
and their national authorities towards more comprehen-
sive arrangements, with clear and detailed obligations 
and even specific institutional mechanisms.’57   
Among the new subjects that the WTO agreements 
have not fully regulated, special attention needs to be 
drawn to the notable expansion of  environmental 
provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements. This is a 
recent phenomenon in the history of  PTAs’ develop-
ment. The creation of  the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) stands out as one the first bench-
marks in this direction.58
The NAFTA was one of  the first PTAs to expli-
citly incorporate environmental concerns into a trade 
agreement.59 There is an attempt to balance the need 
of  states to protect the environment and to expand free 
trade in the Chapter on Standard Related Measures and 
Agriculture and Phytosanitary Measures; by recognizing 
that the investment chapter should not be construed as 
preventing Parties from adopting and enforcing domes-
tic environmental measures; and by incorporating cer-
tain MEAs60 into its provisions.61 
Moreover, NAFTA was only adopted after the ac-
57  BADIN, Michelle; TASQUETTO, Lucas. Os Acordos de Co-
mércio para Além das Preferências: uma Análise da Regulamentação 
sobre os Novos Temas. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, 
n. 1, p. 126, 2013. 
58  BADIN, Michelle; AZEVEDO; Milena. A regulação de Meio 
Ambiente e Questões Trabalhistas nos Acordos Preferenciais de 
Comércio. In: OLIVEIRA, Ivan; BADIN, Michelle (Ed.). Tendências 
Regulatórias nos Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio no Século XXI: os casos 
de Estados Unidos, União Europeia, China e Índia. Brasília: IPEA, 
2013. p. 297-298.
59  It is worth recalling that the European Integration Agreements 
also incorporated gradually environmental concerns. The 1957 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community – EEC 
(Treaty of  Rome), for example, provided for in its article 36 that the 
commitments shall not be an obstacle to prohibitions or restrictions 
in respect of  importation, exportation or transit, which are justified 
on grounds of  the preservation of  plant life. 
60  Article 104 of  NAFTA incorporate the following MEAs into 
its provisions: (i) the Convention on International Trade and Endan-
gered Species of  Wild Fauna and Flore (as amended June 22, 1979); 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(as amended June 29, 1990); and (iii) the Basel Convention on the 
Control of  Transboundary Movements of  Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal. 
61  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 562-563, Mar. 2013. 
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ceptance of  the North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a side agreement es-
tablished to provide environmental cooperation in the 
NAFTA implementation.62 Negotiated at the request of  
the United States, the NAAEC was a political neces-
sity both to allay the fear of  delocalization due to lax 
environmental standards and to ensure Congressional 
ratification.63 There was a preoccupation from the US 
that foreign investments would be displaced to Mexico 
where environmental standards were lower.  
Even though the NAAEC has established a Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and its 
dispute settlement body, the Agreement has been more 
influential in cross-fertilizing environmental issues – for 
example, renewable electricity markets – at regional le-
vel than its adjudicatory function.64 The NAFTA mo-
del influenced significantly the adoption of  subsequent 
PTAs negotiated by the United States. All recent North 
American PTAs devote entire chapters to environmen-
tal issues, including law enforcement and dispute settle-
ment mechanisms.65        
Usually, developed countries have been the prima-
ry drivers in including environmental provisions into 
PTAs. United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
European Union ‘have been among the strongest pro-
ponents, both at the multilateral level and in PTAs.’66 
Developing countries, on the contrary, have been skep-
tical about including environmental provisions into tra-
de agreements. Their preoccupation is that the trade-en-
vironment linkage might turn into an excuse to impose 
disguised protectionist measures. Even though the sco-
pe and depth of  such provisions are not as elaborate as 
62  KONG, Hoi; WROTH, L. Introduction: NAFTA and Sustain-
able Development. In: KONG, Hoi; WROTH, L. (Ed.). NAFTA 
and Sustainable Development: History, Experience and Prospects for 
Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 1.
63  GAGNÉ, Gilbert; MORIN, Jean-Frédéric. The Evolving Pol-
icy on Investment protection: evidence from recent FTAs and the 
2004 Model BIT. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 9, 
n. 2, p. 379, May 2006.
64  TRUJILLO, Elizabeth. A Dialogical Approach to Trade and 
Environment. Journal of  International Economic Law, Oxford, v. 16, n. 
3, p. 565, Mar. 2013.
65  2012 U.S – Korea Free Trade Agreement (Article 20); 2012 
U.S – Panama Free Trade Agreement (Article 17); 2009 U.S – Oman 
Free Trade Agreement (Article 17); 2009 U.S – Peru Free Trade 
Agreement (Article 17); 2006 U.S – Marocco Free Trade Agreement 
(Article 17).
66  ANURADHA, R. V. Environment. In: CHAUFFOUR, Jean-
Pierre; MAUR, Jean-Christopher (Ed.).  Preferential Trade Agreement: 
policies for development. Washington: World Bank, 2011. p. 408.
those proposed by developed countries, ‘countries such 
as Chile, China, and Mexico have been incorporating 
environmental provisions into their PTAs.’67
From that angle, PTAs with environmental provi-
sions are classified on the basis of  three degrees of  le-
gal depth.68 Agreements in the first category introduce 
general provisions on cooperation in the realms of  tra-
de and the environment. Commitments are commonly 
found in a side agreement or in a Memorandum of  Un-
derstanding. Similar type of  PTA is usually adopted by 
China. The second category involves agreements that 
align provisions of  cooperation with the establishment 
of  minimum level of  environmental protection and 
channels for public participation. The European Union 
PTAs signed until the beginning of  the 2000s fall into 
this category. At last, the third category covers PTAs 
that go further on the provisions of  cooperation by 
deepening their regulation through more substantive, 
detailed and binding commitments. Those features can 
be found in the US agreements and in the EU agree-
ments signed after 2000.69
The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has so far conducted one 
of  the most comprehensive studies on the expansion 
of  the environmental provision in Preferential Trade 
Agreements. The first OECDS’s survey on this mat-
ter occurred in 2007 and aimed to analyze the types of  
environmental provisions, the ways they have been in-
corporated and the main incentives for adopting these 
provisions. 
The 2007 Report recognized four main reasons (or 
policy drivers) for States to negotiate environmental is-
sue in PTAs, that are: ‘(i) to contribute to the overar-
ching goal of  sustainable development; (ii) to ensure a 
level of  playing field among Parties to the agreement; 
(iii) to enhance co-operation in environmental matters 
67  ANURADHA, R. V. Environment. In: CHAUFFOUR, Jean-
Pierre; MAUR, Jean-Christopher (Ed.).  Preferential Trade Agreement: 
policies for development. Washington: World Bank, 2011.
68  BADIN, Michelle; AZEVEDO; Milena. A regulação de Meio 
Ambiente e Questões Trabalhistas nos Acordos Preferenciais de 
Comércio. In: OLIVEIRA, Ivan; BADIN, Michelle (Ed.). Tendências 
Regulatórias nos Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio no Século XXI: os casos 
de Estados Unidos, União Europeia, China e Índia. Brasília: IPEA, 
2013. p. 299-300.
69  The 2011 European Union – South Korea Free Trade Agree-
ment and the 2002 European Union – Chile Free Trade Agreement 
are examples of  EU PTAs that falls into this third category due to 
their deeper commitments on trade-related environmental regula-
tion. 
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of  shared interest; (iv) pursuing an international envi-
ronmental agenda.’70
Since then, this OECD study has been updated an-
nually. Its last review disclosed on 25 July, 2014 eviden-
ces some interesting developments on the increase in 
environmental provisions in Preferential Trade Agree-
ments. In accordance with the survey, the types of  envi-
ronmental provisions detected in PTAs are those related 
to: (i) a reference in the preamble; (ii) general and speci-
fic exceptions founded on GATT Article XX or GATS 
Article XIV for protection of  human, animal and plant 
life; (iii) a commitment to upholding environmental law, 
and not weaken it to attract trade or investment; (iv) 
more environmental provisions, such as: environmental 
cooperation, public participation, dispute settlement, 
coverage of  specific environmental issues, specific 
provisions on Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs), and implementation mechanisms.71
Those provisions are incorporated either into the 
main text of  the PTA or placed in separate side agree-
ments.72 They may appear in specific chapters or under 
the cooperation chapter. Of  note environmental and la-
bor issues are often approached under the same chapter 
or even in the same clause. In some PTAs, the chapters 
are entitled social and sustainable development with a 
view to covering both issues.73 These commitments may 
appear as a blend of  legally binding and nonbinding 
provisions.74
In regard to emerging trends in terms of  approach 
70  GEORGE, Clive. Environment and Regional Trade Agree-
ments: Emerging Trends and Policy Drivers. OECD Trade and 
Environment Working Papers, n. 2, 2014. Available at: <http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/environment-and-regional-trade-
agreements_5jz0v4q45g6h-en>. Accessed on: 10 Nov. 2016.
71  GEORGE, Clive. Environment and Regional Trade Agree-
ments: Emerging Trends and Policy Drivers. OECD Trade and 
Environment Working Papers, n. 2, p. 7, 2014. Available at: <http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/environment-and-regional-trade-
agreements_5jz0v4q45g6h-en>. Accessed on: 10 Nov. 2016.
72  ANURADHA, R. V. Environment. In: CHAUFFOUR, Jean-
Pierre; MAUR, Jean-Christopher (Ed.).  Preferential Trade Agreement: 
policies for development. Washington: World Bank, 2011. p. 409.
73  BADIN, Michelle; AZEVEDO; Milena. A regulação de Meio 
Ambiente e Questões Trabalhistas nos Acordos Preferenciais de 
Comércio. In: OLIVEIRA, Ivan; BADIN, Michelle (Ed.). Tendências 
Regulatórias nos Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio no Século XXI: os casos 
de Estados Unidos, União Europeia, China e Índia. Brasília: IPEA, 
2013. p. 297.
74  ANURADHA, R. V. Environment. In: CHAUFFOUR, Jean-
Pierre; MAUR, Jean-Christopher (Ed.).  Preferential Trade Agreement: 
policies for development. Washington: World Bank, 2011. p. 409.
and wording adopted in PTAs’ environmental provi-
sions, there has been stressed  (i) the expansion on the 
general exceptions; (ii) the inclusion of  conflict clauses 
that ensure that obligations in other agreements take 
priority over the trade agreement; and (iii) the establish-
ment of  positive social obligations.75      
Pursuant to 2014 OECD Survey, from 2007 to 
2012, the total number of  Preferential Trade Agree-
ments containing environmental provisions that were 
in force amounted to 77.76 The most common type of  
environmental provision in this sample of  Agreements 
has been the exceptions based on GATT Article XX 
or GATS Article XIV for protection of  human, ani-
mal and plant life. These provisions are an integral part 
of  60 of  all Preferential Trade Agreements reviewed, 
78% of  them. The second most common type of  en-
vironmental provision has been the reference to the 
environment or sustainable development in the Pream-
ble, appearing in 52% of  the PTAs reviewed. The third 
most common type of  environment provision has been 
the mention of  environmental cooperation, accounting 
for 49% of  all PTAs.77 
Of  great significance the 2014 OECD research in-
dicated an increase in the adoption of  more substantive 
environmental provisions. In consonance with the re-
port, these kinds of  provisions remained constant up to 
2010 at around 30% of  PTAs entering into force. They 
then rose to over 50% in 2011 and near to 70% in 2012. 
Among them, the environmental cooperation clause 
has been the most common type, rising from 20% at 
the beginning of  the study to almost 70% in 2012.78
Thus, we can assert that recent international free tra-
75  BARTELS, Lorand. Social issues, environment and human 
rights. In: LESTER, Simon; MERCURIO, Bryan (Ed.). Bilateral and 
Regional Trade Agreements: commentary and analysis. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009. p. 366.
76  GEORGE, Clive. Environment and Regional Trade Agree-
ments: Emerging Trends and Policy Drivers. OECD Trade and 
Environment Working Papers, n. 2, p. 8, 2014. Available at: <http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/environment-and-regional-trade-
agreements_5jz0v4q45g6h-en>. Accessed on: 10 Nov. 2016.
77  GEORGE, Clive. Environment and Regional Trade Agree-
ments: Emerging Trends and Policy Drivers. OECD Trade and 
Environment Working Papers, n. 2, 2014. Available at: <http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/environment-and-regional-trade-
agreements_5jz0v4q45g6h-en>. Accessed on: 10 Nov. 2016.
78  GEORGE, Clive. Environment and Regional Trade Agree-
ments: Emerging Trends and Policy Drivers. OECD Trade and 
Environment Working Papers, n. 2, p. 9, 2014. Available at: <http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/environment-and-regional-trade-
agreements_5jz0v4q45g6h-en>. Accessed on: 10 Nov. 2016.
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de agreements have tended to enhance environmental 
cooperation among participating countries. Three fac-
tors particularly matter for developing regional environ-
mental cooperative mechanisms, which are: (i) networks 
of  intergovernmental organizations; (ii) the strong wi-
llingness of  political leaders often embodied in national 
strategies for regionalism and (iii) the establishment and 
the institutionalized linkage – especially through FTAs 
– between trade and the environment.79
Although PTAs raise the possibility of  addressing 
environmental issues beyond provisions of  coopera-
tion, ‘trade and investment instruments promoting sus-
tainable development goals can be adopted under PTA 
chapters on trade in goods, services, technical barriers to 
trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, government 
procurement, investment and technology transfer.’80
Besides, another main innovation brought by the la-
test PTAs’ generation lies in enforcing environmental 
obligations on the same basis as commercial provisions 
of  the agreement – the identical remedies, procedures 
and sanctions. PTAs ‘enforcement provisions make a 
meaningful addition to environmental obligations, abo-
ve whatever exists in Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments and national laws.’81
As observed, there has been a dizzying dissemina-
tion of  environmental provisions in Preferential Trade 
Agreements in the last decade. In this context, special 
attention should be drawn to the negotiations of  the so-
-called Mega Regional Trade Agreements. Due to their 
regulatory coverage and their geographical extension, 
these agreements may foreground a new paradigm for 
the protection of  the environment through trade regu-
lation. 
79  YOO, Tae; KIM, Inkyoung. Free Trade Agreements for the 
Environment? Regional economic integration and environmental 
cooperation in East Asia. International Environmental Agreements: Poli-
tics, Law and Economics, v. 15, n. 5, p. 721-738, Oct. 2015.
80  COTTIER, Thomas; HOLZER, Kateryna. Addresssing Cli-
mate Change under Preferential Trade Agreements: towards align-
ment of  carbon standards under the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership. Global Environmental Change, v. 35, p. 516, Jul. 2015.
81  HUFBAUER, Gary; CIMINO-ISAACS, Catheleen. How will 
TPP and TTIP Change the WTO System? Journal of  International Eco-
nomic Law, Oxford, v. 18, p. 684, Aug. 2015. 
4. trAns-pAcIfIc pArtnershIp: A new 
pArAdIgm for trAde And envIronment 
lInkAge
The negotiation of  Mega Regional Trade Agree-
ments (Mega-RTAs) is gradually rearranging the world 
trading system into large regional trading blocs gathe-
ring the world’s main developed and developing coun-
tries.82 These agreements are ‘deep integration partner-
ships between countries or regions with a major share 
of  world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
in which two or more of  the parties are a paramount dri-
ver position, or serve as hubs, in global values chains.’83 
In line with Draper, Lacey and Ramkolowan, those 
agreements can be defined as involving three features: 
(i) are negotiated by three or more countries or regional 
groupings; (ii) whose members collectively account for 
25% or more of  world trade; and (iii) the substance of  
which goes further the current WTO disciplines.84 
While the majority of  the Free Trade Agreements 
focus on creating preferential tariff  regimes between 
countries over and above the WTO’s multilateral tariff  
levels, Palit reminds that Mega Regional Trade Agree-
ments are aimed at deepening market-access gains 
beyond tariffs by harmonizing policies and regulations 
so as to influence cross-border movement of  services, 
capital, people, technology, knowledge and ideas.85
A new way of  governing world trade appears to be 
emerging. Even though the creation of  the WTO in 
1994 signaled a process of  centralization of  the world 
trading system that started with the adoption of  GATT 
in 1947, the expansion of  preferential trade agreements 
and the Mega Regional Trade Agreements over the last 
twenty years have reconfigured the governance in world 
trade.86    
82  PALIT, Amitendu. Mega-RTAS and LDCs: Trade is not for the 
poor. Geoforum, Singapore, v. 58, p. 23, Jan. 2015. 
83  MÉLENDEZ-ORTIZ, Ricardo. Mega-regionals: what is go-
ing on? In: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM. Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements: game-changers or costly distractions for the World Trad-
ing System? Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2014. p. 6.
84  DRAPER, Peter; LACEY, Simon; RAMKOLOWAN, Yash. 
Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: implications for the African, Car-
ibbean and the Pacific Countries. ECIPE Occasional Paper, n. 2, p. 8, 
2014. Available at: <http://www.ecipe.org/app/uploads/2014/12/
OCC22014_.pdf>. Accessed on: 20 Nov. 2016.
85  PALIT, Amitendu. Mega-RTAS and LDCs: Trade is not for the 
poor. Geoforum, Singapore, v. 58, p. 24, Jan. 2015. 
86  AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto. Is Trade Governance Chang-
ing? Revista Brasileira de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 12, n. 2, p. 
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If  successfully adopted, Mega Regionals will have 
an extraordinary impact on how the international tra-
de regime is governed. Or even if  no mega-regional 
agreement succeeded, their negotiating objectives and 
ultimate stumbling blocks will shape the future of  the 
WTO.87 Therefore, in view of  understanding the tra-
jectory of  the environmental regulation under trade 
agreements, it is necessary to examine the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). The first Mega-RTA to have its ne-
gotiations concluded. 
Its Environment Chapter is the most far-reaching 
ever achieved in a trade agreement. It contains provi-
sions on topics such as wildlife trade; marine fisheries; 
environmental goods and services; implementation of  
multilateral environmental agreements; access to re-
medies for environmental harm; transparency; coope-
ration; biodiversity; transition to a low-emission eco-
nomy; corporate social responsibility and public-private 
partnerships.88
The TPP introduces new features that are: (i) trans-
parency requirements for fisheries subsidies programs 
and prohibition on some of  the most harmful fisheries 
subsidies; (ii) broad commitments to promote sustaina-
ble fisheries management; and (iii) broad commitments 
to combat wildlife trafficking beyond the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of  Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES).89
The Chapter’s main purposes are to ‘promote mu-
tually supportive trade and environmental policies; pro-
mote high levels of  environmental protection and effec-
tive enforcement of  environmental laws; and enhance 
the capacities of  the Parties to address trade-related 
environmental issues.’90 Environmental law shall not be 
379, 2015.
87  HUFBAUER, Gary; CIMINO-ISAACS, Catheleen. How will 
TPP and TTIP Change the WTO System? Journal of  International Eco-
nomic Law, Oxford, v. 18, p. 679, Aug. 2015.
88  UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE – USTR. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: leveling the playing field for American work-
ers & American Businesses. Chapter 20 – Environment (TPP). 
Available at : <https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/
environment-a7f25cd180cb#.8mi33h9nz>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 
2016.
89  UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE – USTR. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: leveling the playing field for American work-
ers & American Businesses. Chapter 20 – Environment (TPP). 
Available at : <https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/
environment-a7f25cd180cb#.8mi33h9nz>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 
2016.
90  TPP Art. 20.2 (1). 
used as disguised restriction to trade and investment, as 
well as the Parties shall not waive or derogate from its 
environmental law to encourage trade or investment.91
Even though the TPP might never enter into force 
due to the decision of  the U.S president Donald Trump 
to withdraw the country from the Agreement, the lan-
guage consensus on trade and environment protection 
achieved constitutes a new paradigm for the interplay 
between those two fields. The TPP’s text is already 
being use to guide the discussions in this issue in all le-
vels of  negotiation. That is why its analysis still relevant. 
4.1. Implementation of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements
Regarding Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs), the TPP countries affirmed their commitment 
to implement them to which they are already parties as 
well as to enhance the mutual supportiveness between 
trade and environmental law and policy. This should be 
undertaken especially through dialogue between rele-
vant multilateral environmental agreements and trade 
agreements.92 
The Environment Chapter expressly reinforces the 
commitments foreseen in three MEAs93: the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of  
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); the Montreal Protocol 
on Ozone Depleting Substances94; and the Internatio-
nal Convention for the Prevention of  Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL).95 Even though the TPP provisions 
were based on those three MEAs, the CITES is the only 
expressly mentioned in the text of  the Agreement. The 
Montreal Protocol and the MARPOL Convention are 
only referred in the footnotes. Not surprisingly, these 
three agreements are the only MEAs already commonly 
ratified by all the 12 Parties.
91  TPP Art 20.2(3) and 20.3(7).
92  TPP Art. 20.4.
93  Such commitment is quite similar to the one adopted under 
NAFTA (Article 104), except that in the latter, instead of  MARPOL 
you find the 1989 Basel Convention on Control of  Transboundary 
Movements of  Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.
94  The Montreal Protocol was agreed on 16 September 1987 and 
entered into force on 1 January 1989. The treaty is designated to 
protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of  substances 
that are harmful to the ozone layer, causing its depletion. 
95  The MARPOL Convention was adopted on 2 November 1973 
and entered into force on 2 October 1983. The treaty covers the 
prevention of  pollution of  the marine environment by ships from 
operational or accidental causes.
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The CITES seeks to ensure that international trade 
in specimens of  wild animals and plants does not threa-
ten their survival, particularly by protecting endangered 
species (mostly located in developing countries) throu-
gh the control of  demand (from developed countries).96 
The Convention was opened for signature in 1973 and 
entered into force on 1 July 1975. Approximately 5.600 
species of  animals and 30.000 species of  plants are pro-
tected by CITES against over-exploitation through in-
ternational trade. At the time of  writing, 181 States are 
parties to the Convention.97
In order to achieve its goal, the CITES adopts main-
ly two approaches. The first one constitutes strictly re-
gulating species that are threatened with extinction and 
which are or may be affected by trade.98 The second 
approach comprises ensuring that ‘species that are not 
currently threatened with extinction do not become 
so as a result of  un-controlled trade.’99 Hence, ‘CITES 
allows trade, but regulates it, in order to prevent extinc-
tion of  animal and plant species.’100  
The TPP asserts that each Party shall adopt, main-
tain and implement laws, regulations and any other mea-
sures to fulfill its obligations under the CITES.101 The 
Parties further commit to: (a) take appropriate measures 
to protect and conserve wild fauna and flora that it has 
identified to be at risk within its territory; (b) maintain 
or strengthen government capacity and institutional fra-
meworks to protect sustainable forest management and 
wild fauna and flora conservation; and (c) endeavor to 
develop and strengthen cooperation and consultation 
with interested non-governmental entities.102 The crea-
tion and participation in law enforcement networks are 
96  DUPUY, Pierre-Marie; VIÑUALES, Jorge. International Envi-
ronmental Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 398.
97  CITES Secretariat. Convention web-page. Available at: <https://
www.cites.org/eng>. Accessed on: 10 Dec. 2016.
98  TORPY, Renee. If  Criminal Offenses Were Added to CITES, 
Would Nations be Better Able to Restrict International Trade in En-
dangered Species and Protect Biodiversity? Revista Brasileira de Direito 
Internacional, Brasília, v. 9, n. 3, p. 60, Dec. 2012. 
99  TORPY, Renee. If  Criminal Offenses Were Added to CITES, 
Would Nations be Better Able to Restrict International Trade in En-
dangered Species and Protect Biodiversity? Revista Brasileira de Direito 
Internacional, Brasília, v. 9, n. 3, p. 60, Dec. 2012.
100  TORPY, Renee. If  Criminal Offenses Were Added to CITES, 
Would Nations be Better Able to Restrict International Trade in En-
dangered Species and Protect Biodiversity? Revista Brasileira de Direito 
Internacional, Brasília, v. 9, n. 3, p. 60, Dec. 2012. 
101  TPP Art. 20.17 (2).
102  TPP Art. 20.17 (4).
also encouraged.103 
Hence, the TPP includes provisions to combat trade 
in wildlife, plants and fish – whether or not protected 
under CITES – if  they have been taken illegally and if  
they have come from the TPP region. The scope of  
protection of  endangered species of  wild fauna and 
flora’s protection is, therefore, extended beyond the es-
tablished under the CITES. 
Conservation of  especially protected areas, such 
as wetlands and glaciers are also regulated under the 
TPP.104 A panel established under its Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism may also seek advice or assistance from an 
entity authorized in conformity with CITES to address 
a particular matter.105 The help of  such entities could 
improve the balance of  trade and environmental inte-
rests in commercial disputes. 
The TPP strategy is direct: environmental abuses 
could be reduced if  illegal trade in wild fauna and flo-
ra could be restricted more efficiently. These TPP pro-
visions will directly bind the Parties to improve their 
sustainable management of  biodiversity. However, it 
is worth noting that the sole reinforcement of  CITES 
is not the ultimate solution for stopping trafficking of  
plants and animals. More comprehensive outcomes mi-
ght be achieved if  greater efforts to reduce the demand 
for these products in developed countries were carried 
out.106 It is worth noting that other key international 
treaties on biodiversity that cover issues addressed by 
the TPP were not reinforced by it, such as the 1949 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, the 1946 
International Convention for the Regulations of  Wha-
ling and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD)107.108          
103  TPP Art. 20.17 (7).
104  UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE – USTR. 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: TTIP Issue-by-Issue – 
Environment. Available at: <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partner-
ship-t-tip/t-tip-9>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 2016.   
105  TPP Art. 20.23 (2).
106  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 38.
107  Even though the United States signed the CBD in 1993, it 
never ratified it.
108  PEREIRA, Mariana Barreto. O Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement e seus potenciais impactos para a regulação da biodiver-
sidade no âmbito transnacional. Revista de Direito Internacional, Bra-
sília, v. 13, n. 2, p. 377–391, 2016. 
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As regards to the Montreal Protocol, TPP Envi-
ronment Chapter determines that its Parties ‘shall take 
measures to control the production and consumption 
of  and trade in, [substances that deplete the ozone 
layer].’109 The Agreement’s Annex 20-A keeps a record 
of  the measures currently applied by the Parties that are 
deemed to comply with this obligation. Furthermore, 
the TPP recommends110 its Partners to cooperate on 
matters such as environmentally friendly alternatives to 
ozone-depleting substances and the combating of  ille-
gal trade in those products.111 The content behind these 
rules will have a direct effect in the industry of  the TPP 
Parties, which will have to adapt and improve its market 
approaches to substitute substances that deplete the 
ozone layer in a wide range of  industrial and consumer 
applications. 
With respect to protection of  the marine environ-
ment, the TPP establishes provisions on the prevention 
of  pollution from ships, including cooperation in en-
forcement measures by the flag State or, as appropriate, 
by the port State.112 The strengthening of  these provi-
sions grounded in the MARPOL Convention will have 
a direct impact in the regional shipping industry. The 
Parties’ flag State vessels will probably face new obliga-
tions regarding accidental or deliberate pollution; and 
increased protection in special geographic areas.
4.2. Fisheries Subsidies
Total fisheries subsidies are estimated to amount to 
approximately ‘US$ 35 billion, which constitutes 30-
40% of  the landed values generated by wild fisheries 
worldwide.’113 The highest share of  them (about US$ 20 
billion) is constituted by capacity-enhancing subsidies. 
Destructive fishing practices and fleet overcapacity are 
enabled by those government subsidies.114
109  TPP Art. 20.5 (1).
110  TPP Art. 20.5 (3).
111  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 36.
112  TPP Art. 20.6.
113  SUMAILA, Rashid. Trade Policy Options for Sustainable 
Oceans and Fisheries. E15 Expert Group on Oceans, Fisheries and 
Trade System – Policy Options Paper, REF 181215. p. 6. Available 
at: <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Fisheries_re-
port_2015_1401.pdf>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 2016.
114  SUMAILA, Rashid. Trade Policy Options for Sustain-
able Oceans and Fisheries. E15 Expert Group on Oceans, Fisheries 
The TPP seeks to control, reduce and eventually eli-
minate all subsidies that contribute to overfishing and 
overcapacity. Therefore, no Party shall grant or main-
tain any: (a) subsidies for fishing that negatively affect 
fish stocks that are in an overfished condition; and (b) 
subsidies provided to any fishing vessel while listed by 
the flag State or Regional Fisheries Management Or-
ganization or Arrangement for illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing.115 Subsidy programs that 
were created before the TPP’s conclusion shall be brou-
ght into conformity as soon as possible and no later 
than three years after the date of  entry into force of  the 
Agreement.116 Each Party shall also report regularly to 
the other TPP Parties the details of  its fisheries subsi-
dies programs.117
Fisheries subsidies regulation is a major TPP achie-
vement, considering that its Parties rank among the 
world’s largest fish exporters and the subsidies provi-
ded by some of  them contribute substantially to over-
fishing.118 Nevertheless, the TPP provisions are only a 
similar version of  the main Treaty on the matter, the 
2009 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Agree-
ment on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and 
Eliminate Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. 
The TPP is less comprehensive and binding than 2009 
Agreement and it does not require its Parties to adopt 
and implement it. The Port State Measures119 has not 
yet entered into force because it is pending ratification 
by a minimum number of  signatories.120
and Trade System – Policy Options Paper, REF 181215. Available 
at: <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Fisheries_re-
port_2015_1401.pdf>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 2016. 
115  TPP Art. 20.16 (5).
116  TPP Art. 20.16 (6).
117  These notifications shall contain information such as: pro-
gram name; legal authority for the program; catch data by species 
in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided; status of  the fish 
stocks in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided, fleet capacity 
in the fishery for which the subsidy is provided; conservation and 
management measures in place for the relevant fish stock; and total 
imports and exports per species (TPP art 20.16 (10)).
118  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 34.
119  The United States ratified the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port 
State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate IUU Fishing in 
February 2016.  
120  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 35.
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In the multilateral realm, the Doha Declaration assig-
ned the issue of  fishing subsidies to the ‘Rules’ Negotia-
ting Group, which is entitled to negotiate amendments 
to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervai-
ling Measures (SCM). However, over a decade later, the 
group of  Member Countries led by the United States 
(known as Friends of  Fish) did not achieve any subs-
tantive outcome on the matter,121 especially, because of  
‘fundamental disagreements over the respective level of  
commitments expected from emerging countries and 
more advanced economies.’122 
In 2006, the U.S Congress allowed the shift of  its 
fish protection efforts to regional and bilateral forums 
through the amendment of  its primary law governing 
marine fisheries, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Con-
versation and Management Act. The regulation of  this 
subject under the TPP is a direct result of  this policy.123 
The language adopted in the Agreement will probably 
light the way for a WTO multilateral agreement on fi-
sheries subsidies. Its provisions on the subject are likely 
to be used as a model for the negotiations in the next 
Ministerial Conference in Argentina in 2017.
The TPP also foresees other broader commitments 
on marine fisheries protection. The Parties shall seek 
to operate a fisheries management system that is de-
signed to: (a) prevent overfishing and overcapacity; (b) 
reduce by-catch of  non-target species and juveniles, and 
(c) promote the recovery of  overfished stocks for all 
marine fisheries in which that Party’s persons conduct 
fishing activities.124 More precisely, the Environment 
Chapter sets forth that each Party shall promote the 
long-term conservation of  sharks, marine turtles and 
marine mammals.125 These obligations were particularly 
sensitive for many Asian negotiating countries that have 
121  GLASS-O’SHEA, Brooke. Watery Grave: Why International 
and Domestic Lawmakers need to do More to Protect Oceanic Spe-
cies From Extinction. West Northtwest, San Francisco, v. 17, n. 2, p. 
116, 2011.
122  SUMAILA, Rashid. Trade Policy Options for Sustainable 
Oceans and Fisheries. E15 Expert Group on Oceans, Fisheries and 
Trade System – Policy Options Paper, REF 181215. p. 14. Available 
at: <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Fisheries_re-
port_2015_1401.pdf>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 2016.
123  UNITED STATES NATIONAL OCEANIC AND AT-
MOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION. Implementation of  Title IV of  
the Management Reauthorization Act of  2006. Available at: <http://
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/msra_page/2009_report.pdf>. Ac-
cessed on: 5 Dec. 2016.
124  TPP Art. 20.16 (3).
125  TPP Art. 20.16 (4).
the custom of  eating these animals as national delicacy.
4.3 Public-Private Partnership
With regard to voluntary mechanisms to enhance 
environmental performance and public-private partner-
ships (PPPs), the TPP Parties recognized the importan-
ce of  those mechanisms to achieve and maintain high 
levels of  environmental protection and complement 
domestic regulatory measures. They should be designed 
in a manner that avoids the institution of  unnecessary 
barriers to trade and boost environmental benefits.126 
Through the mobilization and sharing of  knowled-
ge, expertise, technology and financial resources, PPPs 
can be an important tool to achieve sustainable. They 
can be designed to provide incentive to the private sec-
tor to adopt sustainable criteria in the conduction of  
its business. Without the responsible, participative and 
active involvement of  the private sector, the current en-
vironmental challenges cannot be overcome.127 In this 
sense, the TPP encourages to the formation of  new 
partnerships between the public and the private sector.
4.4. Committee on Environment
The Transpacific Partnership created a Committee 
composed of  senior government representatives res-
ponsible for the implementation of  the Environment 
Chapter.128 The Committee is competent to: (i) provide 
a forum to discuss and review the implementation of  
the Chapter; (ii) provide periodic reports to the TPP 
Commission; (iii) and provide a forum to discuss and 
review activities.129 All decisions and reports of  the 
Committee shall be made by consensus and be made 
available to the public, unless agreed otherwise.130 
On the matter of  trade in environmental goods and 
services, the senior-level Environment Committee shall 
consider issues identified as potential non-tariff  barriers 
to trade.131 The Parties may also engage in bilateral and 
plurilateral cooperative projects on environmental goo-
126  TPP Art. 20.11 (1).
127  UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND 
RESEARCH. Annemasse Declaration. Available at: <http://www.un-
ppp.org/annemasse-declaration>. Accessed on: 5 Nov. 2016.
128  TPP Art. 20.19 (2).
129  TPP Art. 20.19 (3).
130  TPP Art. 20.19 (5) and (6).
131  TPP Art. 20.18 (3).
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ds and services.132 Even though such initiatives are key 
to unlock renewable energy production among Parties 
and facilitate action on climate change, no specific com-
mitment on trade in environmental goods and services 
was achieved. The issue was delegated to the Commit-
tee to conduct further consultations.     
In addition, the Environment Committee makes 
possible that TPP Members name and shame coun-
tries that do not implement or enforce policies that are 
not legally binding in the Agreement.133 For example, 
even though the TPP does not expressly prohibits sha-
rk finning because its Article 20.16 states that countries 
‘should’ ban these practices, the TPP Environment 
Committee could use peer pressure to change such a 
policy. The successful implementation of  the TPP envi-
ronmental provisions will much depend upon the Par-
ties’ voluntary efforts to make the most of  them.134 
The TPP’s Committee on Environment is a good 
example of  institutional design that could enhance the 
compliance with the trade-related environmental rules. 
Even though the TPP might never come into force, this 
institutional model could be replicated in other PTAs. 
Such a forum is of  key importance in the constant mo-
nitoring, reviewing and improvement of  environmental 
obligations agreed under a PTA’s framework.
4.5. Dispute Settlement
Obligations on the TPP’s Environment Chapter will 
be enforced through the same dispute settlement pro-
cedures and mechanisms accessible for other disputes 
arisen under other TPP Chapters. Thus, the Parties may 
apply trade sanctions when environmental obligations 
have been breached.135 In this aspect, the TPP is more 
comprehensive than the dispute settlement systems of  
132  TPP Art. 20.18 (4).
133  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 35.
134  RIMMER, Matthew. Greenwashing the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership: Fossil Fuels, the Environment and Climate Change. Santa 
Clara Journal of  International Law, Santa Clara, v. 14, n. 2, p. 502, May 
2016. 
135  UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE – USTR. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: leveling the playing field for American work-
ers & American Businesses. Chapter 20 – Environment (TPP). 
Available at : <https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/
environment-a7f25cd180cb#.8mi33h9nz>. Accessed on: 16 Dec. 
2016.
the WTO and the NAFTA. Neither of  them allow for 
the resolution of  issues regarding environment pro-
visions in such an objective and direct manner.136 The 
TPP might then build its own jurisprudence on this new 
regulated subject.
However, before taking a controversy to the TPP’s 
dispute settlement system, the Parties agreed to conduct 
three levels of  consultations.137 Only if  the (i) parties 
consultation, (ii) the senior representative consultations 
and the (iii) ministerial consultations have failed to solve 
the problem, the requesting Party may require the esta-
blishment of  a panel under the TPP dispute settlement 
system.138 
TPP’s Dispute Settlement Chapter also innovates 
insofar as the panels shall be composed not only of  
international trade experts, but also of  experts on the 
matter of  the dispute.139 In this connection, environ-
mental experts may compose a panel that appreciates 
trade disputes involving environmental issues. This 
opens the possibility of  a more balanced decision wi-
thout a purely commercial bias. It is argued that the lack 
of  environmental experts in trade disputes involving 
environmental issues overshadows the preservation of  
natural resources in detriment of  the trade agreement’s 
economic scope.140      
It is worth noting that, the commitments made by 
the Parties under the Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments to which they have joined are also subjected to 
136  HILLMAN, Jennifer. Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In: 
SCHOTT, Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS; Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Pe-
terson Institute for International Economics, 2016. p. 102.
137  A Party may request consultations with any other Party re-
garding any matter arising under the Environmental Chapter by de-
livering a written request to the responding Party’s contact point. 
This consultation request shall circulate to the other Parties that 
may participate in the consultations if  they consider that they have 
substantial interest in the matter discussed (TPP Article 20.20). If  
the involved Parties have failed to resolve the matter, a committee 
of  senior representatives shall be called to address the issue. They 
may gather relevant scientific and technical information from gov-
ernmental e non-governmental experts (TPP Article 20.21). If  the 
senior representative consultations have failed, the Parties shall refer 
the matter to their respective Ministers (TPP Article 20.22). Failing 
all three levels of  consultation, the Party may request the establish-
ment of  a panel.    
138  TPP Art. 20.23.
139  TPP Art. 28.10.
140  PEREIRA, Mariana Barreto. O Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement e seus potenciais impactos para a regulação da biodiver-
sidade no âmbito transnacional. Revista de Direito Internacional, Bra-
sília, v. 13, n. 2, p. 385-386, 2016. 
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the same dispute settlement procedure as commercial 
obligations under the TPP. This will ‘helps to ensure 
that countries do not waive or weaken their obligations 
under MEAs in order to attract trade or investment and 
that a country faces consequences if  it does weaken its 
safeguards.’141 Besides, this legal scheme grants teeth to 
MEAS that lacks biding enforcement regimes. 
It should be noted that TPP’s developing countries 
were very skeptical about the adoption of  binding dispu-
te settlement procedures for environmental obligations. 
Nonetheless, United States accomplish to overcome 
such reluctance by softening other clauses (i.e, ‘should’ 
instead of  ‘shall’) in exchange of  this possibility.142 If  
the TPP one day comes into force, it remains to be seen 
if  countries will really bring trade dispute against a Par-
ty, which fails to live up to its environmental obliga-
tions in a trade deal. The United States, for example, did 
not take action under the US – Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement to combat illegal logging, even when there 
was documented evidence of  non-compliance with en-
vironmental obligations.143
The use of  trade sanctions in response to environ-
mental provisions’ violations has been historically criti-
cized by developing countries. They have argued that, 
due to the current significant discrepancy between the 
levels of  environmental protection between developing 
and developed countries, only the latters would able to 
make full use of  this mechanism in practice. On this 
view, developed countries would be virtually immune 
to this kind of  trade sanctions, since they already have 
a sound established environmental protection system 
with well functioning institutions and effective rules. 
The implementation of  environmental obligations is 
costly and demands high expenditures on infrastructure 
and human capacity building. Developing countries ar-
gue that commercially sanctioning countries that have 
not achieved to comply with these rules is not the best 
approach to incentivize national sustainable policies. 
141  RIMMER, Matthew. Greenwashing the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership: Fossil Fuels, the Environment and Climate Change. Santa 
Clara Journal of  International Law, Santa Clara, v. 14, n. 2, p. 498, May 
2016.
142  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 33-34.
143  RIMMER, Matthew. Greenwashing the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership: Fossil Fuels, the Environment and Climate Change. Santa 
Clara Journal of  International Law, Santa Clara, v. 14, n. 2, p. 503, May 
2016.
They defend that greater emphasis should be put on 
cooperation, technology transfer and technical assistan-
ce initiatives.  
4.6. Other Environment-Related Provisions
It is also important to stress that environmental 
provisions are not restricted to the TPP’s Environ-
ment Chapter. Its Investment and Intellectual Property 
Chapters also set forth substantial clauses on the issue. 
For instance, nothing in the TPP Investment Chapter 
shall be construed to prevent a country from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its ter-
ritory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environ-
mental objectives.144
Moreover, the Investment Chapter determines that 
‘non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as […] the environment do 
not constitute indirect expropriations except in rare 
circumstances.’145 Accordingly, to prove that an environ-
mental measure constitutes an indirect expropriation, 
the Party should carry out a case-by-case inquiry that 
considers: (i) the economic impact of  the government 
action; (ii) the extent to which the government action 
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions; (iii) and the character of  the government action.146 
In addition, it makes up of  an indispensable attitude to 
prove that an environmental measure was not applied in 
a discriminatory manner.
This commitment intends to avoid that corpora-
tions use the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
carved out under Transpacific Partnership to challenge 
environmental policies and other regulatory initiatives 
protecting the environment. This reflects an old claim 
raised by environmental groups fearful that ISDS liti-
gation might outweigh the environmental gains of  the 
TPP.147   
Furthermore, the Intellectual Property Chapter de-
termines that a Party may exclude an invention from 
144  TPP Art. 9.15.
145  TPP Annex 9-B, paragraph 3 (b).
146  TPP Annex 9-B, paragraph 3 (a).
147  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 34.
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patentability when necessary to protect ‘ordre public or 
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to nature or 
the environment.’148 Therefore, a Party may prevent the 
commercial exploitation within its territory of  a patent 
that may harm the environment or put the life or health 
of  humans, animals and plants in danger. That provi-
sion is also mentioned by the TRIPS Agreement (Ar-
ticle 27.2). 
4.7. TPP’s Limitations and Achievements
The Transpacific Partnership fails to establish a fra-
mework that fosters the transfer of  green technology 
to combat global warming, particularly of  renewable 
energy. The expression ‘climate change is not even 
mentioned in the Agreement, because the US nego-
tiators bowed to demands from skeptical members of  
Congress who threatened to vote against the entire pact 
if  [those words] appeared in the text.’149  To replace 
it, the negotiators entitled the section Transition to a 
Low Emissions and Resilient Economy that does not 
dedicate the necessary funding to carry out activities to 
address the issue, being unlikely to be translated into 
effective actions.150
Actually, there are concerns that the commitments 
under the TPP might work against the efforts to com-
bat climate change. The reduction and elimination of  
tariffs and service barriers related to the oil and gas sec-
tor could increase trade in fossil fuels and enable the ex-
pansion of  the American fracking industry throughout 
the Pacific Rim. The TPP’s timid effort to promote 
clean energy policies will probably be counteracted by 
more trade in fossil fuels. The TPP’s weak language on 
climate change falls short to address one of  the most 
pressing environmental problems of  our time.
However, the TPP remains the most important and 
extensive preferential trade agreement until the present 
moment that deals directly with the interplay between 
148  TPP Art. 18.37 (3).
149  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016. p. 39.
150  SCHOTT, Jeffrey. TPP and the Environment. In: SCHOTT, 
Jeffrey; CIMINO-ISAACS, Cathleen (Ed.). Assessing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: innovations in trading rules. Washington: Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, 2016.
trade and environmental protection. Besides, the TPP 
represents an ambitious leap forward since it is the first 
time for the majority of  the TPP countries that they in-
clude an environment chapter and environmental goals 
in their PTAs.151 This is particularly relevant for coun-
tries that make up of  more than one third of  global 
fisheries catch and are the home to roughly one third of  
the world’s threatened species.152         
5. fInAl conclusIons
The Transpacific Partnership is the most advanced 
Preferential Trade Agreement in terms of  environ-
mental provisions already concluded. There is no trade 
agreement currently in force that matches its Environ-
ment Chapter in terms of  breadth and depth of  obliga-
tions and dispute settlement procedures. Even though 
the TPP might never enter into force due to Donald 
Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from 
the Agreement, its treaty language reflects important 
consensus between developing and developed countries 
on rules designed to enhance the mutual supportiveness 
between trade and environmental protection.  
The TPP contains binding provisions and enforce-
ment mechanisms that allow the imposition of  trade 
sanctions in case of  an environmental obligation have 
been breached. This gives greater effectiveness to the 
commitments agreed upon the Environment Chapter 
and enhances national standards of  environmental pro-
tection. 
In addition, some Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments adopted by the TPP Parties also could gain real 
teeth, since the obligations agreed upon were subjected 
to the Dispute Settlement System established under the 
Transpacific Partnership. This could be a relevant boost 
in the effectiveness of  some MEAs that only have weak 
enforcement mechanisms.    
The TPP’s Dispute Settlement System also provides 
for the participation of  specialists other than trade ex-
151  LURIÉ, Andrew; KALININA, Maria. Protecting Animals in 
International Trade: a Study of  the Recent Successes at the WTO 
and in Free Trade Agreements. The American University Law Review, 
Washington, v. 30, n. 3, p. 474, 2015. 
152  LURIÉ, Andrew; KALININA, Maria. Protecting Animals in 
International Trade: a Study of  the Recent Successes at the WTO 
and in Free Trade Agreements. The American University Law Review, 
Washington, v. 30, n. 3, p. 472, 2015.
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perts in the panel’s composition. As a consequence, tra-
de disputes concerning environmental issues may also 
count with the presence of  environmental experts. This 
could diminish the trade bias, normally found in the 
WTO decisions and render them more balanced with 
environmental precepts.
The TPP goes beyond the CITES by taking enhan-
ced actions to combat wildlife trafficking – regardless 
of  whether the wildlife is protected under CITES. The 
Partnership requires its Party to implement its CITES 
obligations and effectively enforce its laws and regula-
tions, including commitments to cooperate by sharing 
information relevant to inquiry of  criminals engaged in 
wildlife trafficking.
The Partnership addresses the sensitive issue of  fish 
subsidies, providing innovative and concrete alternati-
ves that should diminish the destructive effects of  this 
practice. The TPP Parties agreed to gradually reduce 
and, eventually, eliminate the most harmful subsidies 
that are one of  the main causes of  overfishing and 
make their fisheries subsidies programs more transpa-
rent. Such initiatives could help to build up language 
that can light the way for WTO negotiations on this 
matter. The regulation of  fishing subsidies under the 
TPP is a good example of  how common environmental 
problems are more easily addressed in regional efforts 
than in global forums. 
Even though the TPP covers a wide range of  en-
vironmental issues, it does not address other urgent 
environmental challenges such as global warming. The 
‘Transition to a Low Emissions and Resilient Economy’ 
clause is only a euphemism for taking real action in mi-
tigating greenhouse gas emissions. The core subjects, 
such as environmental technologies, renewable energies 
and subsidies were not regulated. There is only a pos-
sible list of  cooperation initiatives. There were, in fact, 
concerns that the TPP could actually facilitate trade in 
fossil fuels and the expansion of  fracking industry in 
the Asia-Pacific Region. Preventive measures to coun-
terbalance such side effects should have been put in 
place within the Agreements’ implementation exercise.
The reasons why the TPP chose to protect some 
environmental aspects and neglected others are based 
on the Parties’ capacity to build consensus in sensitive 
issues that, after all, still have to be approved by the le-
gislative powers of  all signatory countries. Considering 
that the TPP constitutes an agreement mainly driven by 
the United States, the advancements in its trade-related 
environmental clauses display the U.S priorities and be-
liefs that could not be achieved at the multilateral level.
Taking into account the abovementioned arguments, 
we can assert that incorporation of  environmental pro-
visions in the Transpacific Partnership has assumed 
growing importance in the efforts to render interna-
tional trade and environmental protection mutually 
supportive and to achieve the sustainable development 
goals. However, the TPP’s analysis demonstrated that 
environmental consequences of  the implementation of  
preferential trade agreements should be further asses-
sed. Complementary studies should be undertaken to 
analyze the environmental consequences of  the imple-
mentation of  preferential agreements as a whole. This 
would allow the elaboration of  preventive measures to 
overcome possible side effects, such as the increase of  
trade in fossil fuels or the reallocation of  pollution in-
tensive industries, due to the other trade liberalization 
provisions. 
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